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Outlook 2005: Return to Sender
Our 2004 Outlook Two Cheers for the Re-
covery noted that “Positive forces should
drive the recovery into 2004; however,
large imbalances point to growing down-
side risks.”
In the event, the world has indeed seen
a recovery driven by the forces of expan-
sionary fiscal and monetary policies. But
now, on cue, the imbalances – primarily
the 6%-of-GDP US current account deficit
– are coming to the fore. The fundamen-
tal issue now is what the consequences
will be. 
We address the issue in a two-pronged
manner:
• The baseline forecasts, summarised in
the text, have been constructed on the
key assumption that, for the next two
years, the principal imbalance – the
large and growing US current account
deficit – will prove tractable: that the
falling dollar, while not solving the fun-
damental unsustainability of the US cur-
rent account deficit, will keep the worst
of the potential consequences at bay. 
• However, there is a risk of a worse out-
come than that depicted by our base-
line forecast. Because it would stand
to be not only quantitatively, but also
qualitatively, different, we discuss the
issue in a number of special features.
Forces acting
Fiscal policy.The OECD economy has re-
cently seen its biggest discretionary fiscal
expansion for 30 years: 0.4% of OECD
GDP in 2001; 1.6% in 2002; and 0.6% in
2003. This completely reversed the 1990s
reduction in fiscal deficits .
The US fiscal swing has been enormous.
In earlier decades, any swing of 1/2 a per-
centage point or more in a country’s cycli-
cally adjusted budget balance was a ma-
jor event. Yet the recent US fiscal expan-
sion has been about eight times that size,
and the UK swing about four times. In
the euro area, by contrast, and notwith-
standing the clamour over the breaching
of the Stability and Growth Pact, the fis-
cal swing has been small.
However, by 2004 fiscal policy globally
had become near-neutral: there was little
change in the OECD-area cyclically ad-
justed government budget balance, and
such stands to be the case again in 2005.
Thus fiscal policy is set to contribute little
further to the growth of global aggregate
demand.
Monetary policy. Official interest rates glob-
ally are not only historically low, but also are
about 250bp lower than historical experi-
ence would have suggested that they might
be in an output/inflation configuration such
as the present. Again, the US has been
the driver, with its rates around 425bp be-
low those that would be expected on the
basis of historical relationships; euro-area
official interest rates are around 100bp be-
low; but Japanese real rates seem broad-
ly consistent with the cycle.
Oil. Compared with the two great oil-
shock episodes, of 1973/74 and 1978/79,
today’s real oil price is not particularly high:
John Llewellyn
International Spring Conference 2005
Am 17. und 18. März 2005 findet wieder in Berlin in der britischen Botschaft die »International
Spring Conference – Prospects for the European Economy« statt. Am ersten Tag werden die wirt-
schaftlichen Perspektiven wichtiger Weltregionen behandelt. Im Mittelpunkt des zweiten Tages
steht die konjunkturelle Entwicklung in bedeutenden Branchen der europäischen Industrie. John
Llewellyn, Lehman Brothers, New York, wird einer der Referenten sein.
Nähere Informationen zur Konferenz finden Sie unter. www.cesifo.de/isc. Weitere Auskünfte er-
teilen auch Dr. H.-G. Vieweg, managing director, Tel.: +49(0)89/9224-1362 oder Deirdre Hall,
Tel.: +49(0)89/9224-1410.Spring Conference
it would have to have risen to around $ 100/bl to match
where it was in 1978/79. 
In 1973/4 and 1978/9 the oil price rise slowed global GDP
growth to a crawl. Two principal mechanisms were involved:
a weakening of consumers’ real incomes and thereby con-
sumption (the so-called “oil tax”); and the slowness of oil
producers to spend their revenues, which raised the glob-
al saving rate by around 2 percentage points. This time, how-
ever, the effects may have been smaller: in particular, OPEC
has been spending its revenues almost as fast as it has been
taking them in. Hence, while consumers of oil have been
getting hit, exporters have been doing offsettingly well.
The corollary, however, is that, should the price of oil fall sub-
stantially, it may do comparatively little to stimulate world
growth. Consumers would be better off, but exporters more
or less correspondingly worse off.
Major world macroeconomic models (principally those of the
IMF and the OECD) suggest that the rise in the oil price to
$ 50-odd per barrel took only about 1/2 a percentage point
off OECD GDP growth in 2004. If the oil price remains around
$ 40 per barrel, as we expect, lagged effects of much the
same size may be felt in 2005. 
The forecasts: GDP 
Given these principal forces – monetary policy; fiscal
policy; and oil – we expect world GDP growth to slow by
around a percentage point in 2005, to 2.3%. 
Within that overall picture, the US slows by around a per-
centage point, to 3.5% – about the growth of potential. The
principal reasons: the fiscal stimulus is coming off; mone-
tary policy is tightening; consumption seems unlikely to grow
as strongly as it has been; and business investment seems
unlikely to take over the running. Net exports, however, may
strengthen, the result of the weaker dollar.
The euro-area recovery loses its way, with growth slowing to
1.5%, well below the 2–21/2% that is generally considered to
be the growth of potential. The main points underpinning the
euro-area forecast: macro policy, both monetary and fiscal, is
determinedly steady; consumption remains cautious in rela-
tion to its usual determinants; business investment continues
to be more affected by weak sentiment abroad than we, and
others, had earlier expected; and exports are hurt by the
stronger euro. GDP growth in the United Kingdom may come
in below potential, too, as housing weakens and consumers
retrench.
Japan slows down substantially, from near-3% growth this
year to 0.6% growth in 2005 (although around 1 percent-
age point of that is due to a change in the method of cal-
culation of the price deflator). This forecast essentially re-
flects our judgement that the current recovery is not funda-
mentally different from its two predecessors, both of which
aborted due to a failure of domestic demand growth to be-
come self-sustaining. Principal reasons for this judgement
on Japan’s prospects include: deflation has not yet been
conquered; land prices, a bedrock of banks’ balance sheets,
have not yet stopped falling; banking system reform is not
yet complete; and yen strength may not only weaken the
contribution from net exports, but may also further frustrate
the ending of deflation.
Inflation
On the basis of our GDP forecast, the OECD output gap
starts to re-widen in 2005. This suggests that wage infla-
tion is unlikely to be a global problem (although it could be
in depreciating economies). As regards oil, we assume, in
line with the oil futures, that the price remains largely steady,
ending 2005 at around $ 40 per barrel. Non-oil commodity
prices, contrary to what is sometimes asserted, are not out
of line with historical experience: measured in a basket of
currencies, they are much where OECD industrial demand
would suggest they should be. They do, of course, seem
high in dollars, but that is due to the dollar’s depreciation. 
Accordingly, our inflation expectations for 2005 are: US in-
flation holds steady at 2.7% in 2005; the euro area experi-
ences a marked inflation deceleration, from 2.1% in 2004
to 1.5% in 2005, perhaps with most of that occurring in the
second half of the year; and Japan does not get out of de-
flation.
Official interest rates
With OECD growth in 2005 below potential, the oil price
changing little, and non-oil commodity prices doing noth-
ing out of the ordinary, we expect central banks generally
to be cautious about taking official interest rates back up
towards more normal levels. 
Thus in the US, we expect the Fed to hike four times, each
by 25bp. The ECB seems likely to stay on hold all year, but
we see a significant chance that the Bank of England cuts
rates. The Bank of Japan will probably leave rates unchanged
all year.
Bond yields
Bond yields are far from where they can ultimately be ex-
pected to be, once the global output gap has been closed,
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inflation is back to the 2%-odd that most central banks seem
to target, and due allowance is factored in for the increase
in structural budget deficits – in the US, but also in the eu-
ro area and Japan.
However, with official rates increasing only slowly in 2005,
we expect bond yields to make only a limited progression
towards these more normal levels. In the US, we expect ten-
year yields to rise by only around 90bp, to end 2005 at around
5.0%.We expect Europe, with slower growth, lower infla-
tion, and smaller structural budget deficits, to outperform,
with 10-year bund yields increasing by about 60bp, to end
2005 at around 4.1%. And in Japan’s environment of slow
growth, continuing deflation, and no change in official rates,
we expect bond yields to rise marginally, to end 2005
at 1.5%.
Stock markets
A world of below-potential growth does not offer great scope
for top-line earnings growth. So: for the US, our equity an-
alysts see the S&P ending 2005 at around 1300, over 8%
higher than it is now. Given the dollar’s expected fall, the best
common currency equity returns are likely to be in Europe,
where valuations are lower than in the US, and where we
see evidence of a (somewhat belated) programme of cost
reduction in at least the larger corporations. The FTSE Eu-
rope could end 2005 up by around 10%. In Japan, market
valuations are also low. Nevertheless, given the disappoint-
ing economic performance that we expect, the TOPIX may
well underperform European markets, but a rising Yen should
still mean Japanese stocks outperform their US peers in dol-
lar terms.
Exchange rates
Investors have now clearly decided that the US current
account deficit is a matter of concern. The key issue is what
change in the trend of that deficit investors wish to see. Even
in our baseline forecast, the currency movements stand to
be substantial. A continuing slide in the US dollar express-
es itself in the first part of 2005 principally vis-à-vis the eu-
ro, which we see reaching $ 1.45 by mid-year; and against
smaller Asian currencies, which we judge likely to appreci-
ate by 10 to 20%. However, for some months yet, the yen’s
potential rise will likely be held back by further, possibly large-
scale, intervention – intervention funds to the value of around
5% of US GDP have already been ear-marked by the Japan-
ese authorities.
By mid-year, however, this misalignment of the yen is likely
to have provoked serious trade tensions between Europe
and Japan, and possibly also between the US and Japan,
particularly if the US economy is slowing. Europe will argue
that Japan is stealing market share by artificially depressing
its own currency; and the US may argue that it is exporting
jobs to Japan, and importing unemployment.
There is a risk, however, that the dollar move goes much fur-
ther. The US, Europe, and Japan so far show little sign of
accepting that what needs to be done involves policy
action in all three regions. The history of currency crises
suggests that, until there is acceptance of a credible
multi-economy plan, there is an ever-present risk of exces-
sive currency volatility. 
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